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Talking Foreign Policy: 
A DISCUSSION ON CYBER WARFARE1 
Talking Foreign Policy is a production of Case Western Reserve 
University and is produced in partnership with 90.3 FM WCPN 
ideastream, Cleveland’s NPR affiliate. Produced quarterly, the 
program is hosted by Case Western Reserve University School of Law 
Interim Dean Michael Scharf, and focuses on the most relevant 
foreign policy issues of the day.2 The January 30, 2014 broadcast 
covered the constantly evolving field of cyber warfare, and featured 
the following guests:  
•Peter Singer, Director of the Center for 21st Century Security 
and Intelligence, Brookings Institution; 
•Michael Newton, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; 
•Milena Sterio, Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law; and 
•Shannon French, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the 
Inamori Center for Ethics and Excellence, Case Western 
Reserve University 
•Archived broadcasts of Talking Foreign Policy in both audio 
and video format are available at http:// law.case.edu/ Talkin 
Foreign Policy.   
Talking Foreign Policy 
Cyber Warfare—January 30, 2014 Broadcast 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Welcome back to Talking Foreign Policy. I’m 
your host, Michael Scharf, Interim Dean of Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law. In today’s broadcast, we’ll be discussing the 
topic of cyberwar.3 We’ll begin our discussion with Peter Singer, 
Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at 
 
1. Special Thanks to Kristine Moore, Cox Center Fellow at Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, for editing this transcript and 
providing background research.  
2. See Talking Foreign Policy, CASE W. RES. U., http://law. case.edu/ 
OurSchool/FacultyStaff/MeetOurFaculty/FacultyDetail/TalkingForeign
Policy.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
3. See Quora, How Does Cyber Warfare Work?, FORBES (Jul. 18, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2013/07/18/how-does-cyber-
warfare-work/. 
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the Brookings Institution.4 Oxford University recently published 
Peter’s new book on cyberwar and cybersecurity. I just finished 
reading it and it’s an eye opener. Peter, thanks for being with us 
today. 
PETER SINGER: Thank you. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, Peter, we hear so much about cyber 
threats and cyberwar in the news. Where do we stand now? 
PETER SINGER: It’s interesting, this topic of cybersecurity and 
cyberwar. It connects issues that are as personal as your privacy or 
your bank account to as weighty as reach of world politics. Where we 
stand is that we are definitely in an age of huge cyber dependence—
everything from our communications to our commerce, infrastructure, 
and, yes, conflict. Ninety-eight percent of military communication 
runs over the civilian owned and operated internet, so we all depend 
on this cyber world. We live in a digital world, and yet we’re also in 
an era of cyber insecurity. You can see it in everything from the 97% 
of Fortune 500 companies that have been hacked,5 and the 3% who 
just don’t know it yet, to— there have been created over 100 cyber 
military command equivalents around the world. There was a poll 
taken—the first poll of 2014 by PEW—found that Americans are 
more afraid of a cyber-attack than they are of Iranian or North 
Korean nuclear weapons, the rise of China or authoritarian Russia, or 
climate change.6 So, we’ve got this combination of massive use of the 
online world and its rippling effect into the real world via the Internet 
of Things.7 But also, we’re not in a good place, in terms of our 
discomfort and, frankly, our lack of awareness on just the basics of 
this topic and that was the point of the book—to try to connect those 
two together. 
 
4. About the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, BROOKINGS 
INST. (2014), http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/security-and-
intelligence/about. 
5. All Fortune 500 Companies Have Been Hacked: 97% Know It, The 
Other 3% Don’t. HOMELAND SEC. NEWS WIRE (Jan. 8, 2014), http:// 
www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/srcybersecurity20140108-all-
fortune-500-companies-have-been-hacked-97-know-it-the-other-3-don-t.  
6. Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support for Global Engagement 
Slips, PEW RES. CTR. FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (Dec. 3, 2013), http:// 
www.people-press.org/2013/12/03/public-sees-u-s-power-declining-as-
support-for-global-engagement-slips/#top-threats.  
7. See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Definition of “The Internet of Things,” 
FORBES (Mar. 13, 2014, 12:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-
anyone-can-understand/ (“[T]his is the concept of basically connecting 
any device with an on and off switch to the Internet (and/or to each 
other).”).  
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MICHAEL SCHARF: I suppose there’s a spectrum. On one side, 
we’ve got the hacking like we were talking about and then maybe 
surveillance, but on the other side is this concept of cyberwar, which 
you also devote several chapters to. How is this cyber warfare 
different from conventional war? 
PETER SINGER: You hit it exactly. Part of the problem with how 
we’ve approached it is we lump together so many things simply 
because they take place in the realm of zeroes and ones. A good 
illustration of this would be General Alexander, who is in charge of 
both Cyber Command and the National Security Agency.8 You would 
never see that with other military commands and intelligence 
agencies, but because it’s in this we do. But, he testified to Congress 
that each day, in his quote “the US military faces millions of cyber-
attacks,”9 but to get that number of millions he was combining 
everything from political protests and pranks to data theft and 
espionage. But, none of what happened, in terms of these millions of 
attacks, was actually what people think of when they think of 
cyberwar and what they should think of cyberwar, which is a state of 
armed conflict politically motivated with violent means— with 
violence, just like with regular conflict, with regular war itself. You 
can see this in the phraseologies of a cyber-9/11 or a cyber-Pearl 
Harbor. So, we mush lots of things together. I make the parallel that 
it’s a lot like saying that a group of teenagers with firecrackers, a 
group of political protestors in the street with a smoke bomb, a James 
bond spy with his pistol, a terrorist with a roadside bomb, and a 
military with a cruise missile and saying, “Well, these are all the same 
because they involve the chemistry of gunpowder.” Well, no, they’re 
not. And we wouldn’t treat them that way, but we do hear so in 
cyber warfare. It’s definitely— part of why it’s important to 
distinguish what we mean when we say war is that it also allows you 
to get to the true reality of it. When you’re talking about how the 
military actually uses this technology and the nature of the beast, 
when you’re exploring things like computer operations and the like. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And you mentioned, the US, now has a cyber-
command as part of its armed services. It’s not just the sea, land, air, 
 
8. See US May Split Cyber Command and NSA, RT (Nov. 9, 2013, 11:25 
AM), http://rt.com/usa/alexander-retire-nsa-cybercom-438/ (“[General 
Alexander can c]urrently… both direct offensive operations against the 
computers of foreign military targets while also administering campaigns 
to collect intelligence on those entities.”).  
9. See U.S. Military Goes on Cyber Offensive, DEFENSENEWS (Mar. 24, 
2012, 11:09AM) http:// www. defensenews. com/ article/ 20120324/ 
DEFREG02/ 303240001/ U-S-Military-Goes-Cyber-Offensive; 
Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Armed Services, 111th Cong. 233 (2010) 
(statement of Ltn. Gen. Keith B. Alexander).  
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or the outer space anymore. We also have an entire military 
apparatus for cyberspace. But, surely, Peter, they’re not looking at 
the firecrackers and the little teeny things. They’re preparing for all-
out war, right? 
PETER SINGER: That question of mission and responsibility has 
been one of the areas that’s bedeviled the approach to this space 
because of how when you talk about jurisdictions when you talk 
about national borders, it gets very fuzzy when you move into the 
online world. You also have an issue of scale. It’d be surprising to a 
lot of people, but there are actually more folks working in the Fort 
Meade complex—which is where Cyber Commandand NSA are—there 
are more people working in that than there are in the Pentagon 
itself.10 This is a huge growth area and again— 
MICHAEL SCHARF: How much money are we spending on that? 
PETER SINGER: There are a lot of different ways to cut it. To me, 
what stands out is not the exact amount that you’re spending but 
how you’re dividing up your resources. And in the US, we spend 
about four times as much in the governmental side on Defense 
Department cyber operations as we do in the Department of 
Homeland Security on the civilian side.11 Also, if you want to know 
what we are spending on internally, research and development, we’re 
spending—again depending on how you’re categorizing it— we’re 
roughly spending two-and-a-half times to four times as much on cyber 
offense research and development as we are on cyber defense research 
and development.12 I don’t think—I argue that that’s not that most 
strategic approach. It’s a lot like, you talked about those teenagers 
along, if you’re using a metaphor, it’s a lot like being worried about 
 
10. In fewer than ten years, Ft. Meade has expanded from 33,500 employees 
to approximately 57,000 employees, more than twice the number of 
Department of Defense employees at the Pentagon. See Marjorie Censer, 
Fort Meade Transforming From Army Base to Cyber City, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 10, 2013), http:// www. washingtonpost.com/ business/ 
capitalbusiness/fort-meade-transforming-from-army-base-to-cyber-city/ 
2013/10/09/b319a3a0-2792-11e3-ad0d-b7c8d2a594b9_story.html. 
11. See Liz Gormisky, Cybersecurity Spending Up at DOD and DHS in 
FY15 Budget Requests, DEF. DAILY NETWORK, Mar. 12 2014, 
http://www.defensedaily.com/cybersecurity-spending-up-at-dod-and-
dhs-in-fy15-budget-requests-2/. Ed. note: Mr. Singer originally quoted 
the cybersecurity budget differential between DoD and DHS as a factor 
of ten. This transcript has been edited to reflect the actual FY 2015 
numbers. 
12. For FY 2014, Congress allocated $68 for central Cyber Command and 
$14 million for the Air Force’s cyber offensive program, while only 
allocating $5.8 million for cyber defense. See Cyberwar, High-Tech 
Weapons Take Center Stage in Defense Budget, FOX NEWS (Dec. 27, 
2013), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2013/12/27/cyberwar-high-tech-
weapons-take-center-stage-in-defense-budget/.  
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gangs of roving teenagers in your neighborhood, and you’re standing 
there in your glass house and say “You know what? I ought to go buy 
a stone-sharpening kit.” 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, some people do say that a good defense 
is a strong offense, but I want to go back— 
PETER SINGER: No, actually, in both sports and in warfare the 
best defense is a good defense. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Certainly with the Super Bowl coming up 
that’s true. Let me ask you this: so, you mentioned that people are 
talking about a cyber-Pearl Harbor or a cyber-9/11. What are the 
possible major consequences that we could see from a cyber-attack? 
What’s the worst case scenario that you can imagine? 
PETER SINGER: First, let’s caveat all of this by staying within the 
reality of the real world of what’s happening right now before we get 
to the potentiality. So, the fact that there have been over a half 
million references in the media and in academic journals to a cyber-
9/11 or a cyber-Pearl Harbor or the fact that there have been 31,000 
magazine and academic journal articles about the phenomena of cyber 
terrorism, let’s be fundamentally clear that no person has been hurt 
or killed ever so far by cyber terrorism by the FBI definition of it.13 If 
we want to talk about the power-grid-going-down scenario, squirrels 
have taken down the power grid more times than in the zero times 
that hackers have. That’s where we are right now. If we want to talk 
about the actual, now playing out, big national security issues, to me 
the real world one to worry about is the massive campaign of 
intellectual property theft that’s emanating from primarily China.14 
It’s the largest theft in all of human history that’s going on and has 
huge consequences not just for the economy, but for national security 
in the end. Now, if you want to go to the what-ifs of what could be 
there in terms of danger, in the last part the book we explore the key 
trends that are moving forward. And it’s the combination of one thing 
that’s happening with the internet more broadly and one that’s 
happening within cyber warfare. With the internet more broadly, it’s 
the shift to the Internet of Things where we’re not just using internet-
 
13. See Sue Marquette Poremba, Cyber Terrorist Threats Loom 10 Years 
After 9/11, NBC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/ id/ 
44415109/ns/ technology_and_science-security/ t/cyber-terrorist-
threats-loom-years-after/ (“According to the FBI, cyber terrorism is any 
‘premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, 
computer systems, computer programs and data which results in 
violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or 
clandestine agents.’”).  
14. See Emma Wollacott, US Should Get Tough on Chinese IP Theft, 
Committee Warns, FORBES (May 23, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/emmawoollacott/2013/05/23/us-should-get-tough-on-chinese-ip-
theft-committee-warns/.  
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enabled devices to communicate with one another. I email you or 
whatnot, but it’s devices that range from our cars to our thermostats 
to our power grid to our refrigerators all being looped in.15 So, now 
you’ve got the real world being connected. And we’re doing that for 
reasons of efficiency, for gains in the environment, there are all sorts 
of good things out of it, but it also means that there are 
vulnerabilities there that can be tapped with greater consequence. 
We’ve already seen car hacking, we’ve already seen refrigerator 
hacking.16 But, then the second is the development of new cyber 
weapons, and Stuxnet17 is the game changer here where it’s weapon 
that in one hand is like at every other weapon in history. It causes a 
physical change in the world like a stone did or a drone does, but the 
difference is its native zeroes and ones. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: This is what the United States and Israel used 
against the Iranian nuclear reactors right? 
PETER SINGER: It went after Iranian nuclear research. In 
particular, they were operating under a SCADA system18 to control 
things like the centrifuges and the like. It damaged both what they 
were working on and also the systems themselves. And it’s a 
fascinating story that we cover in the book in a lot of different ways. 
One, showing that this new kind of weapon was causing physical 
damage to digital means. It’s interesting in that it’s a weapon that 
was here, there, and everywhere. It was in 25,000 plus different 
computers around the world.19 On the other hand, it might have been 
 
15. See Morgan, supra note 6. 
16. Julie Bort, For the First Time, Hackers Have Used a Refrigerator to 
Attack Businesses, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www. 
businessinsider.com/hackers-use-a-refridgerator-to-attack-businesses-
2014-1.  
17. Stuxnet was a combined attack from the U.S. and Israel on Iran’s 
nuclear program. It targeted the main system in the plant through a 
USB drive carried by a worker. There were two attacks, and the first 
gave hackers an “electrical map” of the Natanz plant. The intended goal 
was to reduce the “lifetime of Iran’s centrifuges… making the…systems 
appear beyond their understanding.” However, the result was that many 
of the centrifuges were destroyed, delaying Iran’s nuclear development. 
See David Kushner, The Real Story of Stuxnet, IEEE INSIDER (Feb. 26, 
2013, 2:00 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-
story-of-stuxnet.  
18. See Anshul Thakur, SCADA Systems, ENGINEER’S GARAGE, http:// 
www.engineersgarage.com/articles/scada-systems (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) 
(describing, inter alia, how SCADA systems monitor and control the main 
operating systems of a factory or plant). 
19. Iran’s Bomb Experts: Israel Used Cyber Weapon to Disrupt Iran’s 
Nuclear Reactor, HOMELAND SEC. NEWS WIRE (Sept. 23, 2010), 
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/experts-israel-used-cyber-
weapon-disrupt-irans-nuclear-reactor; see also Atika Shubert, Cyber 
Warfare: A Different Way to Attack Iran’s Reactors, CNN (Nov. 8, 
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the first ethical weapon ever created in that it could— it may have 
been in all these different computers, but it could only cause damage 
to the one target that it was intended to. So, even if you had the very 
same brand centrifuges in your basement aligned in the exact same 
way, it still wouldn’t have worked on those. It’s fascinating in a lot of 
different ways, but it’s also—one person we interview in the book 
describes this as Pandora’s Box. It opened up a whole new set. So, 
that combination, to answer your question, now cannot just cause 
physical damage, but you now have more targets of greater 
consequence that systems like that can go after. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And, theoretically, that could be used against 
satellites, it could be used against our aviation, it could really cause 
physical damage by shutting down— 
PETER SINGER: SCADA is used in everything from Nuclear 
Research-SCADA, the system that it was going after-everything from 
nuclear research to traffic signals to factories that make anything 
from jet fighters to cupcake wrappers. So, the issue here again is all 
the gains we’ve got now to digitize systems, but that brings with it 
vulnerabilities. The key, though, is you can’t delude yourself into 
thinking that you can protect yourself somehow by disconnecting.  
Some people say “Oh, I may be using this digital system, but it’s not 
linked to the internet.” Sometimes it’s called air gapping.20 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, that’s not the solution. So, what exactly is 
the United States, this new Cyber Command, doing to try to protect 
us from this threat? 
PETER SINGER: So, Cyber Command—one of the other things it’s 
playing out right now is this question: what exactly are its 
responsibilities? Originally, when it was created, Defense Department 
officials talked about how it would just be responsible for defending 
Defense Department networks.21 Like any other organization, again, 
whether you’re talking about militaries or the March of Dimes, it 
slowly but surely, actually in this case quickly, took on a wide variety 
 
2011, 12:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/08/tech/iran-stuxnet 
/index.html.  
20. Air gapping is when malware travels via sound waves to physically 
attack nearby machines. After disconnecting from the Internet, a 
computer can still be infected by air gap malware. See Dylan Love, 
Hackers Can Infect Your Computer Even if It’s Not Connected to the 
Internet, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www. businessinsider. 
com/what-is-air-gap-malware-2014-. 
21. Meg Mirshak, Recruitment, Retention Focus of Fort Gordon’s New Cyber 
Command, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Ga.) (Oct. 14, 2014), http:// 
chronicle.augusta.com/latest-news/2014-10-13/recruitment-retention-
focus-fort-gordons-new-cyber-command; see also Cheryl Pellerin, Rogers: 
Cybercom Defending Networks, Nation, U.S. DEF. DEP’T (Aug. 18, 
2014), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122949.  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Talking Foreign Policy 
326 
of different roles. So, it’s both protecting Defense Department 
systems—it has set up a series of units that are designed to basically 
be operative in cyberwar. They’re able to be tasked out to the 
regional commands and the like.22 Then, there’s another part that’s 
about national protection. And there are units that are basically 
designed to aid in the defensive (not exclusively Defense Department 
networks but other critical infrastructure out there and the like). This 
is when you get into the interesting things of legal authorities, 
budgets, and responsibilities. One of my concerns is that it’s quite 
natural, when you’re talking about threats, to say, “Well, why 
shouldn’t the military be responsible for defending us?” But, the 
problem here is that it causes a shift in and causes a sort of sense of 
complacency. It takes away what responsibility should have. So, think 
about it this way: you’ll sometimes see here people site incidents 
where a group might have done a denial of service on banks. There 
was an incident where a general talked about that that is why we 
needed more funding for Cyber Command. If there was a bank that 
was moving cash to another bank in an armored van, and a bunch of 
protesters stood in the street, blocking it for two hours and then 
dissipated, no one would say “Oh, my goodness, where was the US 
military?” But, change that bank and that money to zeroes and ones, 
and that’s the narrative that we have right now. No, it’s also the 
responsibility of the banks and the like— 
MICHAEL SCHARF: That’s an interesting insight, and we’ll discuss 
this in greater detail when we come back from a short break. We’ve 
been talking to Peter Singer, bestselling author of the book 
Cybersecurity and Cyberwar.23 When we come back we’re going to 
bring three leading experts into the discussion to look at the practical, 
ethical, and legal aspects of cyber warfare.  Stay with us. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Welcome back to “Talking Foreign Policy” 
brought to you by Case Western Reserve University and WCPN 90.3 
ideastream. I’m Michael Scharf, Acting Dean at Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. We’re talking today about 
cyberwar with Peter Singer of the Brookings institute, Colonel Mike 
Newton of Vanderbilt, Professor Milena Sterio of Cleveland Marshall 
College of Law, and Doctor Shannon French from Case Western’s 
 
22. See generally Organization, U.S. ARMY CYBER COMM., 
http://www.arcyber.army.mil/org-uscc.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2015) 
(describing the enumerated responsibilities of U.S. Army Cyber 
Command).  
23. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know…and How 
to Talk About It, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 6, 2014), http:// 
www.brookings.edu/events/2014/01/06-cybersecurity-cyberwar-what-
everyone-needs-to-know. 
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Inamori Center.24 Just before the break, Peter Singer was telling us 
about the US approach to cyberwar. There were some offensive and 
perhaps not enough defense components, but let’s now begin this 
segment with our military expert, Vanderbilt professor and former 
JAG, Colonel Mike Newton. Mike, is it fair to characterize the 
situation that’s going on between countries in the world of cyber 
weapons as a kind of arms race? 
MICHAEL NEWTON: I guess, in a sense it is. But, it’s a different 
kind of arm. It’s really a race for technological supremacy, so the real 
challenge is the same thing we’ve had since the invention of the 
crossbow. How does the law respond? How does national policy 
respond?  The challenges are classic conceptions of what we really 
mean by war and what it means to wage war, and this represents a 
whole new set of actors that are involved in that. Peter quite 
correctly points out there’s this incredibly vast combination of private 
actors, public actors, government infrastructure, and persons acting 
under government influence or, in their minds, to help achieve 
government purposes. So, it’s a very difficult legal conceptual fit to 
simply take the established law of war and cram it down onto the 
context of cyberwar. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Now, Mike, you mention that it’s really about 
technology evolving. That evolution happens all the time, but this 
reminds me of more of a technological leap like the nuclear age. Let 
me bring in Shannon, an ethicist, into the conversation. Policy makers 
didn’t really understand nuclear weapons, so they let the scientists 
and the military specialists do all sorts of Doctor Strangelove25-like 
experiments, some of which I think brought us very close to losing the 
ozone layer. Do you see any parallels to what’s going on with the 
exploration of new weapons and means of warfare in cyberspace? 
SHANNON FRENCH: Well, I will first say something I hope to be 
reassuring. I think we do have better communication going on now in 
terms of policymakers actually seeking out genuine experts and 
getting input from them. I would also say that although it is a little 
bit confusing to many of us, a lot of the world that is this new cyber 
realm can be translated better than a lot of the nuclear science, in 
terms of again speaking directly to policymakers. But, I actually think 
what’s interesting is that there are some strong parallels to what we 
saw in the Cold War with the arms race and the so-called MAD 
 
24. Shannon E. French, Ph.D., Director of the Inamori Center for Ethics 
and Excellence, CASE W. RES. UNIV., http://www.case.edu/provost/ 
inamori/about/meet.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).  
25. See Eric Schlosser, Almost Everything in “Dr. Strangelove” Was True, 
NEW YORKER (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/almost-everything-in-dr-strangelove-was-true (describing, inter 
alia, some of the more improbable plot elements of the film and the 
analogous similarities in the 1960s). 
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strategy, which was Mutual Assured Destruction. 26 In the same way 
that major powers decided “Well, we really can’t nuke one another 
because everybody loses,” there is now the same kind of implicit 
restraint going on with the major powers using large cyber-attacks. 
We’re too interconnected, especially economically, for us to attack one 
another. It is parallel in that, just like in that era, we have now the 
greater worry being rogue groups. It isn’t that we’re worried about 
the major powers attacking one another with their strengths, but 
we’re worried about it more on the level of asymmetric threats. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: But, what about China? I read in the news 
that it’s China that’s pouring all the money in, other than us, into 
this area. Peter, can you tell us what your take is on that? 
PETER SINGER: There are a of couple things. First, you asked 
about arms races. One of the other attributes of every arms race in 
history is that you’re a driving forward force, for very good reason, for 
your security. That’s why they’re investing in these technologies. 
They’re worried about real adversaries out there, and that’s what 
drives the sides in an arms race. The other hallmark of every single 
arms race is that the more you spend, the less secure you end up 
feeling in the end. That’s whether you’re talking about the arms races 
of battleships back prior to World War I, the nuclear arms race, or 
what we’re seeing today on the cyber side.  The other thing, and this 
is where I may disagree a little bit, is that there are some parallels to 
the Doctor Strangelove-ian thinking that’s out there, and you can see 
that. One, and some of the kind of hucksterism—people who 
understand just a little bit about it or even more so stand to benefit 
from hyping a threat or some kind of silver bullet solution to it. A lot 
of the discourse in Washington DC, I joke, has the attributes of 
Spinal Tap and turning the volume up to 11.27 You can see that 
there, and that’s of concern to me. Yet another example would be to 
say that the solution is to create a new, more secure Internet. Well, 
no, that is not going to happen. To your point about China, I’m not 
saying this is purely a threat hyping problem. There are real issues at 
play here, and there are real capabilities being built. We talked about 
the US side, but China is just as active in building up its capabilities 
both formally within its military as well as a much wider network, 
almost like a patriarchic hacker community or a militia community. 
 
26. The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction held that the rapid 
development of nuclear weapons by the United States and Soviet Union in 
the 1950s resulted in neither country wanting to use their nuclear weapons 
on the other first, for fear that “whoever shoots first, dies second.” See 
Mutual Assured Destruction, NUCLEAR FILES, http:// www.nuclearfiles.org/ 
menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-
mutual-assured-destruction.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
27. MARTIN DIBERGI, THIS IS SPINAL TAP 11-12 (Svein I Halvorsen et al. 
eds., 1996).  
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The difference is almost a quality-quantity aspect. There’s a 
description of the Chinese approach towards internet censorship that’s 
called the “human flesh search engine.”28 That’s in many ways the 
parallel here of China, where to stay on the attack side, there’s just a 
massive amount that’s going on. The targets range from the military 
defense companies, oil companies to small furniture makers in New 
England to universities and even my think tank. That’s just in the 
US. In the book we talk about Operation Shady RAT,29 which was 
linked back to China. It hit everything from international 
organizations that range from trade groups to the International 
Doping Agency prior to the Beijing Olympics to Coca-Cola has been 
hit.30 It’s just a massive scale, and that may be the differentiator here. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, let me turn to the legal issue. To start 
with something that Peter was telling us about earlier, and that is the 
Stuxnet attack where the United States and Israel actually were able 
to do a cyber-attack on these nuclear facilities that put Iranian 
construction of nuclear weaponry back about two years as I 
understand it. So, when the US attacks another country like that, 
Milena, doesn’t the President have to authorize an attack? Does he 
need congressional approval? How does this fit into our conventional 
thinking about warfare? 
MILENA STERIO: Under any kind of a conventional analysis of 
warfare, normally our President does need congressional authorization 
to deploy troops.31 On the other hand, our President has the inherent 
 
28. The “human flesh search engine” is a form of cyberbullying in which people 
are targeted after the public takes an interest in their actions. Private 
information immediately becomes public, and the targets are often stalked 
and threatened. See Celia Hatton, China’s Internet Vigilantes and the 
‘Human Flesh Search Engine,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2014), http:// 
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25913472. 
29. Operation Shady RAT (for Remote Access Tool) originated in China and 
hacked into over seventy entities, including elements of the U.S. 
government, the International Olympic Committee, and the United Nations. 
At the time of its discovery, the Operations was still in the process of 
hacking. See Ellen Nakashima, Report on ‘Operation Shady RAT’ Identifies 
Widespread Cyber-Spying, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2011), http:// www. 
washingtonpost.com/ national/ national-security/ report-identifies-
widespread-cyber-spying/2011/ 07/29/ gIQAoTUmqI_story.html.  
30. Ellen Messer, Cyber-Espionage Attacks Threaten Corporate Data in 
New Unrelenting Ways, NETWORK WORLD (Aug 8, 2011, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2179877/security/cyber-
espionage-attacks-threaten-corporate-data-in-new-unrelenting-ways.html. 
31. See Executive Power, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www. law. cornell. 
edu/wex/executive_power (last visited Mar. 16 2015) (“Congress holds 
the power to declare war. As a result the president cannot declare war 
without their approval.”)  
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Constitutional authority as our Commander in Chief to use force.32 
The very difficult Constitutional question is really then: under what 
circumstances can the President act alone without Congress? I think 
most scholars would agree that the President can act alone if our 
nation is faced with some kind of a sudden threat.33 To bring it back 
to this issue of cyber-attacks against Iran, you would have to make 
the argument that the Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities were 
producing nuclear material at such a pace where they were about to 
reach the stage where they were about produce a nuclear weapon, 
which then would be—could be a sudden immediate threat to the 
United States. Under that rationale then you could say our President 
can use force, but that assumes that we’re conceiving of a cyber-
attack by the United States a conventional military attack. I think 
that goes back to— 
MICHAEL SCHARF: If it’s zeroes and ones, we shouldn’t? 
MILENA STERIO: Well, if it’s zeroes and ones that makes it a lot 
more difficult. This is what Mike Newton was also talking about 
earlier. If we’re talking about sending a computer worm called 
Stuxnet over to Iran that doesn’t really require the deployment of US 
troops, is not going to kill anybody, and might slow down their 
production of uranium, we’re not talking about human lives. Can we 
really think of it the same way that we think of, for example, sending 
ten thousand American troops to Afghanistan? I think— 
MICHAEL SCHARF: We’re talking about the U.S. Constitutional 
view, but what about the international view? If a country’s borders 
are sacrosanct, they’re supposed to have, under the UN Charter, the 
right of inviolability.34 What if another country comes in and 
penetrates you not physically but with zeroes and ones over the 
Internet and does damage to you that costs a lot of money and hits at 
your very national security? Is that a violation international law? 
MILENA STERIO: That kind of an act under international law 
could be viewed as aggression, which is really a use of force by one 
state against another state or group of other states that doesn’t 
comply with the normal rules of international law. Basically, you can 
use force only in self-defense or if the United Nations Security Council 
authorizes you to use force.35 Here we have to analyze the nature of 
the cyber-attack. Is it just zeroes and ones? Are we just talking about 
 
32. Id. 
33. CHRIS EDELSON, EMERGENCY PRESIDENTIAL POWER 7 (2013).  
34. U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security.”). 
35. Id. 
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slowing down a nuclear plant or are you also taking down an entire 
power grid? Are you talking about neutralizing an entire 
infrastructure? All the defense missiles? It really comes back to the 
scope and nature of the cyber-attack. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: I want to talk to Shannon about the ethical 
aspects of this. Let’s say you’re the expert who was tasked to launch 
the cyber-attack. As an ethicist, what are your thoughts about the 
psychological and ethical implications on that person, on US 
personnel who are engaged in cyber warfare acts? 
SHANNON FRENCH: Well, as an ethicist, you always worry when 
there’s distance and potential detachment. Every time someone has to 
make a decision that has an impact on the lives of others and the 
harder it is for them to see and judge that impact, the less likely they 
are to make the ethical choice. They’re likely to be more callous, and 
that is simply a consequence that we’re familiar with. It’s 
interesting— we’ve actually talked about this on this program in a 
different context. There’s a lot of worry about that with the drones. 
Actually, it was discovered, to some folks surprisingly, my own in one 
stage, that the drone operators were seeing their victims very close up 
and were actually experiencing high levels of PTSD.36 They were 
having to work, almost like a sniper does, their relationship to the 
people that they were targeting. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: But, that wouldn’t be true here. 
SHANNON FRENCH: That wouldn’t be true here. That very 
distance that people thought the drone operators would have is 
something the cyber folks really could have. Maybe that worry needs 
to be revived in this context. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: You’ve said before if you don’t have skin in 
the game you’re likely to make mistakes. 
SHANNON FRENCH: But, I do have to put a caveat in here. It 
actually connects back to something that Peter said. I think we can’t 
lose sight of the potential good herein terms of cyber weapons. 
Actually, I think he suggested they might be more ethical in some 
contexts. And I recognize that. If they are more precise and if they 
actually don’t have the kind of collateral damage that we worry most 
about, if they’re not harming vulnerable populations— 
MICHAEL SCHARF: If our option was to either do cruise missile 
strikes on the nuclear weapon facilities in Iran, and there was a lot of 
 
36. See Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), NAT’L INST. MENTAL 
HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/post-traumatic-stress-
disorder-ptsd/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 17, 2014) (explaining 
PTSD); see also Agata Blaszczak-Boxe, Drone Pilots Suffer PTSD Just 
Like Those in Combat, LIVE SCIENCE, http:// www. livescience. com/ 
47475-drone-operators-develop-ptsd.html (Aug. 20, 2014, 5:20 PM) 
(providing specific examples of soldiers who piloted drones and 
experienced PTSD as a result). 
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collateral damage to civilians, but instead just send the zeroes and 
ones over the internet and we accomplish the same thing, well, yeah, 
that makes sense. 
SHANNON FRENCH: And maybe we don’t care how callously we 
feel…if in fact in the real world—with an outcome with saving a lot of 
lives and including again vulnerable population lives. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, let me then turned to Mike Newton. 
Mike, you’ve got a new book about proportionality in the laws of war. 
Who, by the way, is the publisher of that? 
MICHAEL NEWTON: That would be Oxford University Press, and 
it makes a great Saint Patrick’s Day present. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, Oxford’s got this broadcast down. But let 
me ask you, if the harms caused by a cyber-attack would sometimes 
rise to a physical level that might justify a conventional military 
response— is that possible? 
MICHAEL NEWTON: It’s theoretically possible, but this is the issue 
that Shannon was just edging up to. The entire corpus of the laws 
and customs of war really is— designed to regulate kinetic hostilities, 
to protect innocent civilians, and to keep the thread of humanity. 
Even in the middle of intense armed conflict for all commands and for 
all persons with some core, there’s a fundamental recognition of basic 
human dignity and human rights. And the problem is in cyberwar 
that when you begin to talk about taking zeroes and ones, as Peter 
correctly says, and using them to inflict real physical damage, and 
then talk about applying the laws and customs of war in response to 
that, that’s a paradigm shift in response to the paradigm shift. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: But, let me make this more concrete, Michael. 
What if the cyber-attack by the United States didn’t just damage the 
nuclear research that was going on, but actually caused the nuclear 
reactor to blow up? Now what? 
MICHAEL NEWTON: Well, you get two huge problems: one is the 
problem of causation. Was it caused by private actors, public actors, 
because of the basic law or principle that all of your activities must be 
directed at all times against lawful combatants or the participants in 
the conflict.37 In the cyber context, it’s enormously complex in real 
time to run that back and figure it out exactly in terms of causation 
because of how broadly that expands. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, what happens like in the Stuxnet where a 
couple months later somebody leaked it out?38 I don’t know if it was 
 
37. Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups, 
4 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 83, 83 (2003).  
38. See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks 
Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 1, 2012), http:// www. nytimes. 
com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-
cyberattacks-against-iran.html. 
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the Obama administration bragging about it or if it was someone 
who’s unhappy about it that just leaked it, but these things do leak 
out. So, let’s say the US does the attack in cyber space, it blows up 
the nuclear reactor in Iran, and then it leaks out that it was the US 
and not some non-state actor that was behind this. Then what? 
MICHAEL NEWTON: But, that’s one of the attractive beauties of 
cyber operations. It’s designed not to blow up the nuclear reactor in 
Iran, and it didn’t, in fact. There was no human being—no effect 
whatsoever. So, it’s a highly theoretical question. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, you won’t take the bait then? 
MICHAEL NEWTON: Peter talked about the responsibility of Cyber 
Command. I think that’s the key authority. Immediately as soon as 
you move into the military context, you have got to articulate what is 
the mission statement, what is the scope. And from that, the specified 
tasks, precisely what is the military supposed to accomplish, and the 
implied tasks, the things that are necessarily implied, that have to 
happen in order to accomplish that. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: All right so, let me switch it around here— 
MICHAEL NEWTON: Within the context of cyberwar that is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to do. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, Mike, let’s switch it around. Let’s say it 
was Iran who does the cyber-attack against the United States, and 
there’s maybe a nuclear reactor that blows up. Right? Because you’re 
focusing on well, the US won’t do this, but I’m just trying to get to 
the question of what if some country does it to another. Does that 
then equate to an armed attack? 
MICHAEL NEWTON: In theory, yeah, if you cause the legal 
languages that the damages are of the scope, magnitude and intensity 
to equate to an armed attack. But, the problem is that by definition 
these are not armed attacks; they are cyber-attacks, denial of services, 
or clogging of computer networks. It takes an incredibly—and in fact 
I would say it would be the worst cyber-attack in history if it did 
actually unintentionally result in some physical damage. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Peter, do you think that there would ever be a 
cyber-attack from one country to another that would result in 
physical damage? Is this just a hypothetical or is this something 
that’s perhaps possible and more even likely? 
PETER SINGER: Well, I mean, it’s not a hypothetical because 
you’ve been talking about a real-world case where it happened. I 
mean, Stuxnet was a cyber-attack that resulted in physical damage.39 
Now, it was what we would describe as an act of espionage, not war, 
but you can get back and forth on that and that’s reflecting domestic 
 
39. See Stuxnet: Computer Worm Opens New Era of Warfare, CBS NEWS 
(Jun. 4, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/stuxnet-computer-worm-
opens-new-era-of-warfare-04-06-2012/.  
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legal concerns. But, to your broader question of when does a cyber-
attack become an act of war, in the meaningful term of “Oh, it just 
happened in cyber but it means we’ve got to go to war.” The reality 
is—so, first, this is not always so clear when you’re talking about 
regular armed warfare. Think about the example of if someone fires a 
weapon, a rifle, or what not at my nation, that’s of course an act of 
war. Well, actually, no. We have border disputes all the time. Okay, 
well, actions that have no weapon use can still be an act of war. You 
could, for example—if you deliberately flooded your neighbor’s entire 
country, and it was a cascade that caused thousands of lives to be 
lost, no one would say, “Well, goodness, there was no gunpowder 
there, so it’s not an act of war.” We judge it by the effects. But, in 
the book, where I wrestled with this, in the end there’s this quote 
from a guy who puts it best: “in the end, the President’s going to 
decide.”40  And, that’s—it comes down to a human judgment when 
it’s a war, when it’s a state of armed conflict, when it’s something 
else. But, it’s a human decision. The concern, though, to one of your 
prior points, and where it ties in with drones, is not so much how the 
operators look at this but how the politicians look at it. Whether 
you’re talking about a drone or a cyber-weapon, it’s very seductive to 
politicians because it seemingly offers an effect without risk.  As we’ve 
seen with whether it’s drones or cyber weapons like Stuxnet, what 
you often want to happen is not always the way it plays out, whether 
it’s physical collateral damage or the fact that this covert operation 
leaked or the fact that this weapon that was designed only to go after 
one target in the world popped up in twenty-five thousand other 
computers around the world,41 which is not something that would 
happen with a regular bomb. It’s just a complex space. But, again, to 
me it’s—if we want to worry about the human views of it, it’s not so 
much the operator. It’s us. It’s the body politic and the politicians. 
MICHAEL NEWTON: Michael, this is Mike, just one clarification— 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Mike, we need to take another a short break 
now and then we’ll start the conversation back in just a minute. I 
love it when we can end, and things are hot and heavy because that 
means the listeners will stay tuned. We’ll be right back. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: This is Michael Scharf, and we’re back with 
“Talking Foreign Policy.” I’m joined today by Peter Singer in D.C., 
Mike Newton in Nashville, Shannon French and Milena Sterio are 
with me here at WCPN ideastream in snowy Cleveland. We’re talking 
 
40. P.W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIEDMAN, CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERWAR: 
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 126 (2014).  
41. See Mathew J. Schwartz, Cyber Weapon Friendly Fire: Chevron Stuxnet 
Fallout, DARK READING (Nov. 12, 2012, 2:30 PM), http:// www. 
darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/cyber-weapon-friendly-fire-chevron-
stuxnet-fallout/d/d-id/1107339?.  
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about cyberwar. Now, just before the break Mike Newton, our Colonel 
from the JAG wanted to jump in and add something, so Mike, here’s 
your chance. 
MICHAEL NEWTON: So, I just want to really clarify, very briefly, 
one of the things that everybody is alluding to, but I want to say very 
clearly in legal terms. The big difference between acts short of an all-
out armed conflict in response to a cyber-attack or in a cyber-context 
is that the law actually only permits the actor to do what’s strictly 
required—what’s narrowly tailored only to ameliorate the threat. 
That’s the law of self-defense, the classic law of self-defense, the 
classic law of counter-measures, and the classic law of embargo short 
of armed conflict.42 The point is that that rule and the legal construct 
and all of the other range of laws and customs of war change 
dramatically once we recognize we’re in the context of an armed 
conflict. That’s why this distinction matters a great deal because in 
the cyberwar context, it’s easy to say we’re only allowed to use that 
degree of force or cyber technology necessary and narrowly tailored to 
strictly eliminate the threat. The problem is it is so incredibly difficult 
to ascertain precisely what that means in that context. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And that’s a great segue for what I wanted to 
talk about next, which is the question of how international law 
applies to the conduct of a cyber-war. Let me begin with Shannon. 
You have written books about this. What was it, the last book?  The 
Code of the Warrior.43 Is it possible to apply century’s old criteria of 
just war tradition44 to something so new and different like cyber 
warfare, a form of war made possible by advanced technology? 
SHANNON FRENCH: Well, this is a drumbeat of mine. This is 
something that I try to get out there as much as possible. There is 
nothing new under the sun in the way that is relevant to changing the 
just war tradition. What I mean by that is of course we have new 
technologies, of course we have new forms of weaponry, but the trick 
is not to then say, “Oh, my goodness, we must create a whole new 
theory of just war.” It’s to figure out how to apply these tried-and-
true principles to these new advances. For example, we’ve already 
been alluding to many of them. The core principles of just war, things 
like proportionality,45 discrimination,46 right authority, 47 all of that is 
 
42. The Just War Theory “deals with the justification of how and why wars 
are fought.” There are both moral components and physical components 
to the theory. See Alexander Moseley, Just War Theory, INTERNET 
ENCYC. PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwar/ (last visited Mar. 16, 
2015).  
43. SHANNON E. FRENCH, THE CODE OF THE WARRIOR (2004).  
44. See Moseley, supra note 41. 
45.  Proportionality “concerns how much force is morally appropriate.” Id. 
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still valid and true. And, it hasn’t changed just because we have this 
new way of doing it. I would just like to emphasize again something 
that Peter mentioned earlier. It is the job of the just war tradition to 
try to limit the scope of war and also to hopefully, it seldom actually 
has succeeded at this, but actually to limit the number of wars we get 
ourselves into. Anything that lowers the bar towards getting into a 
war is very worrisome ethically. I would also add finally on this point 
that when we see groups with greater technologies, and especially 
world powers using them in a powerful way against weaker groups or 
groups that don’t have the same technologies, that asymmetry can 
create new enemies, as well. So, where it may be appealing to a 
policymaker since we didn’t put any boots on the ground, we may 
actually be leading to more deaths, more threats because we are 
putting ourselves out there in a way that is going to make more 
people angry at us as a nation. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And this is a theme that Peter makes in his 
book as well.48 Peter do you want to elaborate on that? 
PETER SINGER: Well, a of couple things. The first, in complete 
agreement that you shouldn’t try to see these discussions like, “Oh, 
we need to write a new Geneva Convention for the cyber world.” One, 
that doesn’t make sense, and two, it’s completely unworkable. Again, 
I’m in agreement with the idea to pull from the values that have been 
tried-and-true. We do need to understand, though, that there are new 
kinds of challenges that were never contemplated. One is the idea of 
disaggregating the military49 versus a civilian. Makes perfect sense 
when you’re thinking about conventional weapons, but the Internet 
itself is civilian, so you will inherently be using— you can’t— if 98% 
of US military communications go over the civilian owned and 
 
46. Discrimination in just war “concerns who are legitimate targets in war.” 
Id. 
47. Right authority, also known as “legitimate authority,[it is] the securing 
of peace and the uplifting of good.” See LUKE BRADLEY CAMPBELL, JUST 
WAR, LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY, AND NON-STATE ACTORS iii (2011). The 
basis of legitimate authority “acknowledges that governments and law 
are the foundation of the good life.” The presumption of order and 
security necessitates that war must sometimes be waged by a legitimate 
authority in the defense of such; this idea is a moral concept. See also 
id. at 6. 
48. P.W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIEDMAN, CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERWAR: 
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 122–26 (2014) (discussing application 
of old laws to new technology).  
49. Disaggregating the military means to give military satellite tasks such as 
communications and navigation to smaller military spacecraft. See Sandra I. 
Erwin, Air Force Continues to Ponder New Ways to Buy Satellites, NAT’L 
DEF. MAG., Oct. 13, 2013, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ blog/ 
Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1297. 
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operated Internet,50 this is the mashing up of this already. The other, 
and this is where again there’s a cross with drones, is that it’s not 
that there’s no decision making. It’s that the locus of decision making 
is now moving both geographically, and now when you move into 
both autonomous robotics but also cyber weapons, chronologically in 
ways that make it very difficult for older laws to wrestle with. So, 
Stuxnet was a weapon that, so to speak, was fired, and its effect 
played out months later. It’s a really interesting space. There are a lot 
of challenges to it. But, I’m the son of an army JAG officer, and one 
of the things you can argue on pretty much everything is that there’s 
this idea that the law is conclusive on something. No. That’s—there 
are huge amounts of arguments on everything from the Geneva 
Conventions to what the Constitution says about everything from 
abortion to gun rights. This is a new manifestation of it, so when 
someone says this is legal or this is not, that’s their interpretation of 
the law. Unfortunately, the real world is much more difficult to figure 
out. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Shannon, did you want to add something? 
SHANNON FRENCH: Well, I agree with all of those points. I simply 
wanted to add that often times the great difficulty, but the important 
work to be done, is to figure out what is the right analogy. If we have 
seen different kinds of weapons in the past and we have hopefully 
figured out how we ought to respond to them, how do we find the 
analogy with these new forces and then use those laws correctly? 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Now, I have to point out that not everybody 
agrees with the view that the current law is sufficient for this new 
threat. And, if you go on blogs there are superstar experts in the field 
that are debating this issue, so let me turn to Milena. How would you 
make the argument that there needs to be a new Cyber Geneva 
Convention, and what would be its essential provisions? 
MILENA STERIO: Sure, so the Hague Law,51 the Geneva 
Convention, and the treaties that we have currently were written so 
long ago before nuclear weapons, before drones, and certainly before 
any kind of cyber weapons. There really—the drafters never 
contemplated anything like what we’re seeing today. There is— I 
should mention that there is a treaty called the International 
Convention on Cybercrime52 which was adopted in 2001 by the 
 
50. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects 
of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (2010).  
51. The Hague Peace Conferences produced multiple provisions of the customs 
and international laws of land warfare. See Hague Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 1. Oct 
18, 1907, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195?OpenDocument. 
52. The International Convention on Cybercrime is an international treaty 
in regards to criminal acts through “computer systems, networks, or 
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Council of Europe, but that convention really falls short of detailing 
everything that you would want in a in a comprehensive multilateral 
treaty. So, some of the main points of view— 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Let’s focus this. It’s low-level cyber-attacks, 
not this giant thing. We’re talking— its low level— 
MILENA STERIO: We’re talking about low-level cyber-attacks and 
encouraging member states to prosecute those at the national level. 
So, if you want to talk about a big multilateral treaty on 
cyberwar/cyber-attacks, first you would want to carefully define: 
“what is a cyber-attack?” and “what is cyberwar?” Then you might 
want to think about prohibiting certain types of cyber-attacks, similar 
to how certain types of attacks are prohibited under traditional 
conventions. So, you might want to prohibit cyber-attacks on things 
like hospitals, infrastructure, airlines, and things where you basically 
think that the civilian suffering is going to far outweigh whatever 
military objective you’re trying to achieve. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And then, you would basically say that any 
country that did that was the equivalent of someone who commits 
genocide or crimes against humanity. It’s a violation of international 
law. Their leaders could be potentially prosecuted. 
MILENA STERIO: Exactly. So then, you would want to somehow 
tie it into the existing international law and basically say, “Well, then 
that’s an act of aggression that’s illegal under international law.” And 
the leaders now face individual international criminal responsibility. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, Peter, you’re against that approach. What 
do you think is the problem with it? 
PETER SINGER: What we push for in the book is the idea of 
grafting. Grafting is something that both studies in international 
relations have found to be more effective in building international 
cooperation but also it’s taken from horticulture. And it’s the idea 
that, let’s just be blunt, if you tried to create an entirely new Geneva 
Conventions right now, you’d never get any agreement on it. You 
would not get any ratification of it by the key states. A good example 
in the cyber world is that NATO asked a group of top, really smart 
minds to come up with a manual for the legal side of cyber warfare: 
the Tallinn Manual.53 It’s in many ways a great document, a lot of 
 
data.” There is no legal bind to the treaty until the country’s 
government ratifies the treaty. See International Issues: Cybercrime, 
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Feb. 15, 2011), https://cdt.org/ 
insight/international-issues-cybercrime/. 
53. Relevant provisions of the Tallinn Manual include the following: 
• Nations cannot knowingly use cyber infrastructure to harm other 
nations 
• Nations may be held responsible for cyber-attacks done by private 
agencies directed against other nations; if any individuals or actors that 
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interesting stuff in it, and then what happened? The United States, a 
NATO member, said, “Yeah, but we’re not bound by that.” So the 
point is that grafting— it’s instead of trying to plant a new tree, it’s 
to build off of what already works effectively. And so, the example 
that was mentioned there would be the cybercrime treaty that’s—
there’s some trying to bring new members in. What I’m getting at is 
that I would love the idea of trying to combine legal thinking with 
real-world politik, and that’s the challenge of this space. We need to 
not approach it in siloed arguments from our own issue areas, but 
understand what’s possible or not possible both on the technical side, 
on the political side, and also on the legal side and bring them all 
together. One last point, it’s sort of a fascinating one that illustrates 
the kind of cool but crazy aspects of this space. When we have an 
illustration of what we might want to build into a treaty that would 
not find its space in a traditional Geneva Conventions approach is 
when we say, “Okay, there are certain things we don’t want to 
target.” In regular national laws it’s—we shouldn’t target civilians, 
and there are really important things not to target among civilians 
like ambulances, churches, or hospitals. You particularly don’t go 
after those. In cyber, we typically say things like hospitals and the 
like, but the one that really matters on a huge level that most 
everyone would agree to is the financial system. The only nation that 
wouldn’t be taken down by an attack on anyone’s financial system 
because of the ripple effects would be North Korea. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Milena, you wanted to add something. 
MILENA STERIO: Just a very quick note. I mean, I definitely agree 
with Peter that it would be extremely difficult and probably 
impossible as of now to negotiate a big multilateral treaty.  But an 
approach which would maybe fit under that idea that Peter’s talking 
about is maybe to use soft law54 instruments to supplement what we 
already have. So, it is much easier to negotiate codes of conduct 
guidelines and things of that sort that can then supplement, for 
example, the cyber convention that we already have. And the hope— 
the goal would be that over time, if states then are using that kind of 
 
commit such acts are under state direction, then accountability for the 
acts will be attributed to that state 
• Any cyber attach that causes harm to people or objects will justify a 
response with force, though cyber operations that merely annoy or 
inconvenience states will not justify armed responses 
See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (2013). 
54. Soft law is usually seen as an agreement upon a rule that is not binding. 
See Gregory Shaffer & Mark Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, 
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. 
L. REV. 706 (2010). 
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soft law (the guidelines, the codes of conduct) that maybe at some 
point we’ll be closer to a customary norm of law. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: As I understand it, the Tallinn manual that 
Peter mentioned is something of that sort. Mike Newton, you’ve 
studied this. Do you have particular criticisms of any of the provisions 
of the manual? 
MICHAEL NEWTON: I think it’s good. I agree with Peter. To 
extend the horticulture metaphor, the fig leaf of law here is really no 
solution. We feel really good that we’ve got a new convention, we’ve 
got some software, and we’ve got some codes. The problem is that we 
haven’t really dealt with the relevant actors. The big problem in the 
Tallinn Manual as well as the ICRC whole study about when a 
civilian crosses the threshold into legally participating in conflict to 
the extent that they can be targeted,55 the direct participation study, 
is exactly the same thing as discussions for close to a decade. And in 
the end, no real agreement. So, I think the—this approach that says, 
“Well, we need more laws” is kind of quixotic. I agree with Peter 
about the financial system. The other one that I would say that 
almost everybody would agree with ought not to be messed with is 
this system that regulates transnational aviation flight. How many 
flights around the world go down with all kinds of consequences? 
That’s a no brainer. The problem is that all the things that we want 
to protect in a real all-out cyberwar become the indirect victims of an 
all-out cyberwar. There’s no real way in an all-out cyberwar when you 
shut down the electric grid, at least theoretically, to control who that 
affects and how that affects them. So, that’s the core problem with 
trying to reach any real binding legal code of conduct, if you will. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So let me throw out one other issue that sort 
of keeps me up at night. And, that is if we’re spending all this money, 
if we have Cyber Command, and we’re making it have major military 
approach to the possibility of cyberwar and cyber-attacks, can that be 
used as a way to erode our own civil liberties and privacy? And I 
know, Shannon, you’ve been thinking about this. What would you 
say? 
SHANNON FRENCH: Well, yeah. I mean, this is a very big concern 
because always you do have to balance security against other rights 
issues like privacy. But, something that Peter mentioned earlier is 
really important for us to remember, and that is how easily you can 
hype these kinds of fears. When you think about that survey that 
Peter mentioned where people are more afraid of a cyber-attack than 
they are of these very real urgent threats that we are not giving 
money towards and that are not getting enough attention, focus, or 
 
55. NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE GUIDE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
(2009), available at https:// www.icrc.org/eng/ resources/ documents/ 
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resources to try to address them, that’s actually quite horrifying.56 
And if you put in front of people in very stark terms: “this is how 
much money you are spending as a nation to prevent this cyber-
attack, which is in many ways not likely to happen and would be not 
even in the interests of the groups you’re afraid of, in the end of the 
day when you could spend that same amount of money and save this 
many lives if you put it towards cancer research or this much benefit 
towards education and so forth,” it would be very frustrating. And 
yet, if you scare people enough, they will hand over their privacy 
incredibly easily. And I’ll just add one other point which is I think 
this is where the lack of transparency is also a bit terrifying for 
ordinary civilians, which is that we don’t know exactly how much 
privacy we have already given up. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: All right so we’re almost out of time. I want to 
go back to Peter Singer, the author of the book Cybersecurity and 
Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know and say Peter, you’ve got 
the last word. Where do you think we’re going to be in ten years in 
terms of this issue? If we’re having this broadcast ten years from now, 
what are we talking about? 
PETER SINGER: Well, we’ll probably be downloading it into our 
brains. In all seriousness, the one word that I would—that I hope 
we’ll end on at that point is “resilience.” You can think about 
resilience in terms of the physiological or the psychological. The 
physiological is that I hope we have an approach to cybersecurity 
with what it means more broadly that goes beyond just thinking we 
can build up higher walls, we can deter the danger, or we can scare it 
away.  Your body expects that it’s going to be in a dangerous world, 
and so it has layers of defenses, and it does everything from isolate 
the attack to it has an internal monitoring system to a triage. There 
are all different ways, and so we’ve got to move out of this mentality 
of just thinking that I can keep it out. The more important meaning 
of resilience is a psychological side. It’s—you can think of the parallel 
in the British approach to terrorism versus ours. “Keep calm and 
carry on.” Resilience in a psychological way is saying, “I expect that 
there will be bad things in the world, but it’s all about how I’m going 
to power through them. And if I get knocked down, how I’m going to 
get back up rapidly.” That’s really where I hope this shifts to. So, the 
bottom line here is that as long as we are using the Internet, and ten 
years from now we will be, we will face these threats. And so, 
therefore we have to work to manage them and be more resilient 
about them. 
MICHAEL SCHARF: That’s a great final note. On September 5th, 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law is going to be having 
 
56. Bruce Stokes, Extremists, Cyber Attacks Top Americans’ Security 
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a day-long symposium on this subject. I invite you to join us live by 
coming to Case Western, if you’re in the Cleveland area, or you can 
tune in, listen to it, and watch it by webcast anywhere in the world. 
Meanwhile, if you want to weigh in on the discussion that we’ve been 
having or suggest a topic for an upcoming broadcast, please send an 
email to talkingforeignpolicy@case.edu. I want to thank again our 
panel of experts: Peter Singer, author of Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: 
What Everyone Needs to Know, Col. Mike Newton from Vanderbilt 
University, Professor Milena Sterio from Cleveland Marshall College 
of Law, and Doctor Shannon French from the Inamori International 
Center for Ethics and Excellence at Case Western. I’m Michael 
Scharf. You’ve been listening to “Talking Foreign Policy” produced 
by Case Western Reserve University and WCPN 90.3 ideastream. 
 
